This chapter is devoted to describing how children process the meaning of utterances that hinge on the interpretation of logical terms such as or, and, some etc. While the literal meaning of these terms is comparable to those found in logical textbooks (e.g. P or Q is inclusive and thus compatible with P and Q), each of these expressions typically is interpreted with a richer, pragmatic, meaning (e.g. the offer of "Coffee or Tea" implies not both). Experimental data show that children interpret these expressions with less pragmatic enrichment than adults, and thereby bring invaluable insight into how semantic and pragmatic aspects of meaning are processed. Taken together, recent experimental findings demonstrate the importance of context in encouraging pragmatic enrichment at all ages. The data also provide support for a Relevance Theoretic approach to comprehension and comprehension development.
Introduction
While the literal meanings of or, and and some are comparable to those found in classical logic (e.g. P or Q is inclusive and thus compatible with P and Q), each of these expressions is readily understood as having a richer meaning in context (e.g. the offer of "coffee or tea" implies not both). The challenge for linguists, philosophers and psycholinguists has been to reconcile the two apparent meanings. While the difference between classical and everyday interpretations of logical terms could be viewed as a case of semantic ambiguity (e.g., by saying that or is ambiguous between the exclusive (A or B, but not both) and inclusive meanings (A or B including the possibility of A and B), philosopher Paul Grice insisted that, whenever possible, words and expressions should rather be assigned a single meaning (or at least as few senses as possible) (Grice, 1978 . He thus proposed that part of the information conveyed through our utterances is not linguistically encoded, but pragmatically derived.
For instance, the semantic meaning of connectives (such as or) and quantifiers (such as some) is separated from the pragmatic component which Grice termed Conversational implicatures. His approach thus allows many expressions whose meaning varies from context to context to have a single core meaning, which may be enriched at the pragmatic level by context-dependent assumptions (i.e.
conversational implicatures).
Although Grice's distinction between core linguistic and pragmatically derived meaning has been the topic of discussion among philosophers and linguists for several decades, it is only recently that his claims have been tested experimentally with children and adults. Here, we aim to show precisely how developmental studies support the pragmatic analyses of logical terms that Grice suggested. We begin by summarizing the developmental findings that have been critical in establishing the semantic-cum-pragmatic meanings of logical terms and in demonstrating just how general this Grice-inspired effect is.
We then turn to data that show how pragmatic enrichments of logical terms (socalled scalar implicatures) can be encouraged among young children and suggest that children are more likely than adults to interpret terms literally rather than pragmatically. In order to show that this particular developmental trend is not limited to scalar implicatures, we then focus on another type of pragmatic enrichment: one linked to the conjunction and. Finally, we contrast the developmental trajectory linked to the pragmatic enrichments of logical terms with data on a genuine case of ambiguity (All are not sentences). We show that the latter produces a very different developmental profile, further demonstrating the uniqueness of the developmental trend associated with cases that rely on pragmatic enrichments of logical terms.
Weak logical terms
Experimental studies of conversational implicatures have focused mostly on a paradigmatic case, known as scalar implicatures. An example illustrating this phenomenon is presented in (1) wherein a speaker uttering (1a) will typically be taken by the hearer to imply (1c).
(1) (a) Some of the guests have arrived.
(b) All of the guests have arrived.
(c) Not all of the guests have arrived.
Under a Gricean analysis, the implication in (1c) would be seen as a conversational implicature. The reasoning is as follows: proposition (1b) is more informative than (1a) which it entails. Presumably, the more informative proposition would make a greater contribution to the common purpose of the conversation. Thus, when the speaker uses a weak term (e.g. some), the hearer thereby understands that she has reasons not to use a stronger one (i.e. all).
Therefore, if someone says, "Some of the guests have arrived", the hearer is entitled to infer that not all guests have arrived. The idea is that the hearer assumes that the speaker abides by Grice's (1975 ) first sub-maxim of quantity ("Make your contribution as informative as is required"), at least so long as she can honour the second sub-maxim of quality as well ("Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence"). Therefore, presumably, she either does not know whether (1b) is true or she knows that it is not.
Neo-Gricean researchers (e.g., Horn, 1972 Horn, , 1989 have put forward slightly different analyses of effects such as that shown in (1) based on the notion of semantic scales. Semantic scales are a set of alternate terms or expressions of the same grammatical category ranked by order of informativeness from weaker to stronger; e.g. <or, and>, <possible, certain> and <some, all>. The use of a weaker term from one of these scales will tend to result in an implicature to the effect that the speaker is not in a position to use the stronger expression, either because she does not know whether her utterance would then still be true, or because she knows that it would be false. Similar accounts can be given for the everyday interpretation of utterances such as those in (2) all is a common narrowing down of the literal meaning of "some"
at the level of the explicature of the utterance (Noveck and Sperber 2007:193) .
Genuine scalar implicatures on the other hand are much less frequent than is generally assumed (and much less frequent than the kind of narrowing mentioned above) and will only be computed if there is a mutually manifest reason for the interlocutors to wonder about the more informative expression.
Imagine for instance that Mary is about to offer several balloons to a neighbour's child after a party and Bill asks " Are those all of the balloons?". If
Mary answers: "These are some of them," Bill would be entitled to draw from this utterance the implicature that these are not all the balloons since Mary is answering a tacit question concerning all of the balloons and she does not provide an exhaustive response . In these cases, and in this sort of case only, the use of a scalar term will be taken to implicate the negation of a stronger one in the fashion of genuine scalar implicatures.
At the heart of a Relevance Theoretic approach is that both explicatures and implicatures (scalar or otherwise) are the result of highly context-dependent inferential processes guided by expectations of optimal relevance on the hearer's part. They take place "when the consequences that render the utterance relevant as expected are characteristically carried by this narrowed down meaning" (Noveck and Sperber 2007:193) . Therefore, the two types of scalar cases are very similar in psychological terms: crucially, they both proceed from highly context-dependent inferential processes. Like all other pragmatic inferences, those linked to scalar expressions are made by the hearer in order to meet contextually defined expectations of relevance.
Gricean and post-Gricean approaches (e.g. Sperber and Wislon, 1986 /1995 , but also Horn 1989 and Levinson 2000 all recognize the distinction between the literal meaning of terms and the various enrichments that they can offer. 
Experimental findings on scalar terms
Experimental work to date has focused on children's interpretation of so-called scalar expressions like some and or. This work has brought to light a developmental trend that at first seemed surprising, because it showed that children are more likely than adults to treat the weak term (e.g. some) as compatible with one that is stronger on the scale (all). The second author was in fact the first to conduct systematic experiments on children's treatment of scalar expressions, he showed that 8-to-10-year-olds do not make scalar inferences associated with some and might to the same degree as adults (Noveck 2001) . These results were supported at the time by classic studies that inadvertently included scalar expressions (Paris 1973 , Smith 1980 , Braine and Rumain 1981 as well as by more recent studies that specifically aimed to replicate Noveck's effect (e.g., Chierchia, Guasti, Gualmini, Meroni, Crain and Foppolo, 2004; Guasti, Chierchia, Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini and Mernoni, 2005; Papafragou and Musolino, 2003) . (For a review of experimental work on the acquisition of scalar terms see also Noveck, 2004; Pouscoulous and Noveck, 2004; and Siegal and Surian, 2004.) A surprising developmental effect Noveck's (2001) study of children's understanding of scalar expressions began by examining the inference generally associated with might -which excludes must. The experiment involved presenting children with three boxes; the first one contained a toy bear and a toy parrot, the second one had only a toy parrot while the content of the third one, which remained covered, was hidden from view. The child was told that the content of the third boxwas identical either to that of the first box or to that of the second box. The participant's task was to decide whether a puppet was right or wrong when it uttered the (critical) item: "
There might be a parrot in the box". Clearly, in this context the sentence, "There must be a parrot in the box" is more appropriate than, "There might be a parrot in the box". Children answering "correct" to "might be a parrot" were assumed to be interpreting the modal might as compatible with must -i.e. with its classical logical sense -and not to be making the pragmatic inference that prompts might to exclude must. Children who think the puppet is wrong in saying, "There might be a parrot in the box", were seen as adopting a pragmatic interpretation of might (i.e., not must). The results with children aged 7 to 9 years old, shown in Figure 1 , suggested that they gave the narrower "logical"
answers 80% of the time. Adults, on the other hand gave this answer only 35%
of the time, suggesting that children do not make the scalar inference associated with might to the same degree as adults. (Importantly, the children and adults responded correctly at high rates to the seven control items which demanded both true (e.g. "There must be a parrot in the box") and false (e.g.
"There must be a bear in the box") responses.)
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE Another experiment, based on Smith (1980) , explored the inference provoked by some (i.e. but not all). The critical items were of the form: "Some elephants have trunks" or "Some giraffes have long necks": this sentence is logically true, but it is pragmatically underinformative because we know that "all elephants have trunks" and "all giraffes have long necks". Children (8-and 10-year-olds) had to say if these sentences were true or false. Most children who answered almost perfectly to the control questions (true quantified sentences, false quantified sentences, and absurd ones such as "All crows have radios") accepted the pragmatically underinformative utterances (at rates of 89% and 85%, respectively), while adults tended to reject them as false (41% accepted these Unlike adults, children accept (rather than reject) utterances expressed with relatively weak terms (e.g. might, some) when a stronger one (must, all) is called for, and thus appear to be more (classically) logical than adults. But we must now ask how generalisable these results are to other scalar expressions and whether perhaps children are simply unable to draw pragmatic inferences in general.
Developmental impediments in understanding scalar inferences?
Other developmental studies have extended our understanding of the developments described above. Noveck's (2001) findings have been generalized, with 5-year-old subjects, to other scalar expressions, such as start (not finish) and numerals (Papafragou and Musolino, 2003) , as well as or (not and) . In all these experiments, the great majority of children accepted the weaker term as compatible with a stronger one, whereas adults would either consider them to be incompatible or at the very least equivocal.
Importantly, these researchers have found that, as it was hypothesized by Noveck (2001) , when the circumstances are right, children are able to make appropriate pragmatic inferences. So their poor performance with scalar inferences is not due to semantic or pragmatic inability. In one set of studies, Papafragou and colleagues (Papafragou and Musolino, 2003 ; see also Papafragou and Tantalou, 2004) showed that children as young as five are able to produce scalar inferences given the right conditions. In a first experiment, Papafragou and Musolino (2003) , found, as indicated above, that 5-year-olds are less likely than adults to produce implicatures with some, start, and number words. In a second experiment, they, then, went on to modify their experimental setup in two ways. First, children received training enhancing their awareness of pragmatic anomalies before they were tested. They were told that the puppet would say "silly things" and that the point of the game was to help the puppet "say it better" (e.g. they would be asked whether a puppet described a dog appropriately by saying "This is a little animal with 4 legs"). In the event that the child did not correct the puppet, the experimenter did. Secondly, the modified paradigm put the focal point on a protagonist's performance. Unlike the original experiment, where children had been asked to evaluate a quantified sentence such as Some horses jumped over the fence (when in fact all the horses did), the modified paradigm raised children's expectations about the stronger case (all). Participants heard test sentences such as, "Mickey put some of the hoops around the pole" (after having been shown to succeed with all of the hoops), but they were also previously told how Mickey claimed to be especially good at this task which is why another character challenged him to get all three around the pole. With these changes (training and a focus on a stronger contrast), 5-year-olds appeared more likely to produce scalar inferences than in the first experiment, though they still produced them less often than adults. Guasti et al. (2005) took the investigation a step further. In a series of experiments on the understanding of some by 7-year-olds they first replicated Noveck's (2001) results with respect to the underinformative sentences such as Some elephants have trunks, and then used this as a baseline to tease apart the role of the two factors manipulated by Papafragou and Musolino (2003) . First, they examined the role of training and found that training young participants to
give the most specific description of a given situation did indeed have a major effect on their performances. While in the baseline experiment 7-year-olds rejected statements such as "Some giraffes have long necks" only 12% of the time (against 50% for adults), when trained their rejection rate went up to 52%, i.e. it matched the adult responses. Interestingly, however, this effect was short-lived and was not found when the same participants were tested a week later.
In their last experiment, Guasti et al (2005) also tested whether the salience of the scalar inference influenced the interpretation of some. They rendered the all-alternative more salient in context, for instance, by showing the participants a story featuring several characters deciding whether the best way to collect a treasure was to drive a motorbike or ride a horse. After some discussion, the scenario revealed that all of them chose to ride a horse. In this way it was made clearer that the sentence to be evaluated, "Some of the characters chose to ride a horse", is underinformative. The results indicated that when the outcome of scalar inferences is highly relevant in context, children will compute them in an adult-like manner, at least by the age of 7.
To summarize, the evidence suggests that children's natural tendency is to interpret scalar expressions in context semantically, while adults are either equivocal between a semantic understanding and a pragmatic one, or prefer the pragmatic reading. However, when the contrast between the weak scalar term and a more informative one is made salient in context, children become more adult-like Musolino 2003, Guasti et al. 2005) , suggesting that despite their semantic preferences, they do have the appropriate pragmatic capacity.
The effect of complexity on children's performance First, nine-year-olds were tested on the French equivalent of some/all (certains/tous) using four cardboard boxes placed in front of the children with different plastic animals displayed in and around the boxes. The main test item was "Some turtles are in the boxes" when the scenario revealed that there was a turtle in each of the boxes. The nine year olds responded affirmatively 91% of the time and adults 53% to the test items. We thus reproduced the effect from earlier experiments using the standard Truth-evaluation task with a weak quantifier certains, arbitrary materials, and plenty of distractor items (e.g. a statement such as "There is a hippopotamus and a dolphin in the same box").
In the next experiment three changes were made to the above design. First, distractors were removed, i.e. only key and control items were kept. Second, the task was modified so that children's responses were determined by an action in response to a puppet's wish. For the critical underinformative item, participants were shown a set of five boxes each containing a token before hearing "I would like some boxes to contain a token." In this scenario, inaction (which is hard to do) would indicate accepting the statement as true with a minimal semantics whereas an action (removing a token or two) would indicate that the participant pragmatically enriched the statement. Finally, the French indefinite certains (meaning some) which was used in the first experiment was replaced by a simpler expression, quelques. The quantifier quelques is more a frequent word than certains, it more frequently used by younger children and it also seems to be semantically simpler than certains (i.e. quelques is a simple existential while certains is a partitive -for a detailed explanation see Pouscoulous et al., 2007) . In order to establish whether the development of the inferencing in this case increases progressively with age, children of three age groups (4-, 5-and 7-year olds) as well as adults were tested with this modified setup. The results are shown in Table 1 .
PUT . It is still the case, however, that even in a task which strongly encourages implicatures to be drawn, younger children are less likely to draw them, suggesting a developmental impact of cognitive processing.
Experimental findings and pragmatic theories
The picture of children's understanding of scalar inferences sketched above suggests three conclusions. First, the literal, semantic meaning of scalar terms generally suffices for children, even in utterances where adults would generally draw the inference (at least to some extent), indicating that this reading is primary. Second, there is no threshold in the development of children's capacity to make scalar inferences: their performances are not linked to specific ages, rather they depend on the relevance of the semantic expression in context, the effort required by the task, and probably the accessibility for them of the scalar expression in a given language; in fact, Pouscoulous et al. (2007, Experiment 3) reveal how pragmatic inferencing is more likely with quelques rather than certains). Third, young children before the age of 7 do not carry out scalar inferences with ease, i.e. younger (4-to 5-year-old) children have greater difficulty carrying out pragmatic enrichments than adults and have never been shown to do it at the same rate as their older cohorts.
These findings demonstrate the psychological reality of scalar inferences, as well as supporting specific pragmatic accounts of scalar terms over alternatives. We can now ask whether one will find children behaving differently with respect to the enrichment of and and in a way we saw with scalar terms. Initial experiments with and suggest that enrichments of sentences do indeed produce a developmental effect akin to scalars. An exploratory study (Noveck and Chevaux 2002) presented seven-year-olds, ten-year-olds and adults with a small set of four very short stories (among fillers), each followed by a conjunctive comprehension question. For two of the comprehension questions, the order of its two conjuncts respected the sequence of events in the story and for the other two the conjuncts were inverted. For example, one story described a girl, Julie, who had answered a phone call in the second sentence and accepted an invitation to a birthday party in the fifth. Participants were then required to respond Yes or No to one of two kinds of follow-up questions:
(4a) Julie answered the phone and accepted an invitation?
(4b) Julie accepted an invitation and answered the phone?
Agreeing with (4b) indicates that the participant accepted the minimal meaning of the conjunctive sentence (that both conjuncts are simply true). Rejecting (4b) would indicate that the sentence was enriched, making the order of the two conjuncts relevant. Whereas the rates of agreement to (4a) were high and accurate for all participants, the authors found that 85% of seven-year olds, 63% of ten-year-olds, and 29% of the adults respond affirmatively to (4b). The adults' rates of affirmation were lower than those produced by the children while also defying chance predictions. The children were evidently less fussy than adults about the conjuncts' sequence. That ten-year-olds respond affirmatively to questions like the one in (4b) after having read (and while still having available) the story is impressive, indicating that they do not readily enrich such sentences.
In follow up work, Noveck, Chevallier, Chevaux, Musolino and Bott (in preparation) are using reading times to further explore the cognitive impact of enrichment on interpretation. Results suggest that adults, as predicted, are more likely to reject inverted sentences like those in 4b (82% of adults reject while only 56% of 10-year-olds do). More interestingly, inverted sentences judged as true among the 10 year olds are read significantly faster than inverted sentences judged as false. This is an indication that the enrichment is part of a time consuming process (see also Bott and Noveck 2004 ).
Again Relevance Theory seems to provide a natural interpretation of the data:
the minimal, linguistically-encoded meanings of utterances containing and form the basis from which they are pragmatically enriched. Moreover, in this framework, sequential ordering of actions is only one possibility for enrichment of and. Carston (1993 Carston ( , 2002 principled distinction between scalar inferences and pragmatic enrichments of and: both are examples of a listener's best efforts to make a speaker's utterance more informative (see Noveck and Sperber, 2007) . The developmental story for both types of expression is that children are generally more likely than adults to accept the minimal, linguistically-encoded meaning of and, while adults more consistently apply pragmatic enrichments. This suggests that developmental-pragmatic effect, associated with scalar terms, is generalizable to other pragmatic enrichments and that it is even more robust than previously imagined.
Indeed, some studies on metaphor suggest that the developmental patterns linked to it are akin to the patterns for the pragmatic enrichment of logical terms (see for instance Noveck, Bianco and Castry, 2001; Winer, Cottrell, Mott, Cohen, and Fournier, 2001) . The comprehension of a word in its metaphoric sense requires an enrichment of the encyclopedic entry of a critical term (i.e.
from its literal meaning to its metaphorical meaning) (Wilson and Carston, 2007) . In these cases, as for scalar inferences and the enrichment of and, sophisticated listeners, unlike unsophisticated ones, have the resources available to derive figurative meanings, thus suggesting that pragmatic enrichments of all sorts are not available for free.
A genuine case of ambiguity: Every…not sentences Throughout this chapter, we have argued that instead of interpreting scalar terms and conjunctions as ambiguous, pragmatic theories (Grice's, neo-Gricean and Relevance Theory) provide motivation for the maintenance of a single core semantic meaning that is pragmatically enriched in context. This does not mean, however, that there is no such thing as ambiguous quantifier expressions. We turn to the case of Every… not as exemplified in (7a) below:
(7) a. Every horse did not jump over the fence.
b. Not every horse jumped over the fence.
c. All horses are such that they did not jump over the fence.
Utterances such as (7a) can have two interpretations. When the negation takes scope over the quantifier (Not > every), one arrives at the interpretation in (7b) and when the quantifier takes scope over the negation (Every…not or None) one arrives at the interpretation in (7c).
Musolino, Crain and Thornton (2000) reported that adults are more likely than children to accept the Not every interpretation, as in (7b), after being shown two of three horses jumping over a fence. Children, on the other hand, demonstrate ambiguity between the two readings or a preference for a None reading, as in (7c) (Musolino, Crain and Thornton, 2000) . After several follow-up investigations, Lidz (2003, 2006; Lidz and Musolino, 2002) currently hypothesize that Every…not sentences are syntactically ambiguous but that either performance factors play a role among children or that scope relations favour a None reading among children (Musolino et al., 2000) . That is, children either base their judgements on one of the two possible readings (chosen at random) or there are reasons (based on contextual factors or parsing mechanisms) that encourage a None reading. As themselves point out, the findings and suggestions from the papers on Every…not sentences resonate with the work showing that young children are less likely than adults to produce scalar implicatures. Given that adults often prefer Not every interpretations in the same tasks where children tend to resist these makes them relevant to the current discussion.
To further explore these effects, Noveck, Guelminger Georgieff and Labruyere, (8): (8) All the children are not in the pool.
Participants were presented with stories in which ultimately 2-of-3 protagonists were shown doing something or in which 2-of-3 objects shared a feature (e.g., see Table 2 ). For example, in a story concerning the sentence above, the critical test sentence was presented in a context in which two of three children are in the pool (while a control item would present a scenario that ends with all three in the pool). If participants adopt the None reading, they ought to respond negatively, while if they adopt the Not every reading, they ought to respond positively. Given that the sentence is ambiguous, one would expect children and autistic participants to prefer either (a) the initial parse (the None reading), or else (b) to show evidence of being equivocal about the two interpretations. In any case, based on prior findings, one should expect typical adults to prefer the Not every reading, which leads to a true response in this context.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
The results show an adult preference for the Not every reading in 2-of-3 contexts and equivocality among children and participants on the autistic spectrum. This is in line with the expectation that syntax makes the two readings equally available and that adults, unlike young children and autistic participants, are efficient at exploiting the context (i.e. pragmatic features) in order to come up with a single consistent reading. Although further studies are necessary to determine which pragmatic explanation best accounts for these sorts of data, it is clear that ambiguous structures do not produce the same sort of developmental profile as scalar terms or conjunction.
Although ambiguity and enrichment are both context-dependent phenomena, they also differ from each other, which is why linguistic theories distinguish between them and, arguably, why they yield different developmental profiles. In the case of ambiguous sentences, linguistic decoding-whether it be semantic or syntactic (as in the every-sentences we've discussed) -gives rise to two interpretations. The context plays a crucial role in choosing the one that corresponds with the speaker's meaning. This is a mandatory process since if one is not in the position to choose, the utterance cannot be properly understood. Additionally, there is no reason to assume a priori, that one interpretation is cognitively more costly than the other; one way or another the hearer must decide between the two possibilities and this is going to involve some amount of pragmatic inferencing.
In the case of pragmatic enrichment (whether linked to a scalar term, and or of another type), the form delivered by linguistic decoding is unambiguous (it is a single form) and sufficient for arriving at an interpretation. This form may, but need not, be enriched depending on the context. Furthermore, context also determines the nature of the enrichment; for instance, the conjunction "and" can be interpreted as and then or and thus. In the case of ambiguity, processing is devoted to determining a valid interpretation. In the absence of a preference, the children (and the participants on the autistic spectrum) are left non-plussed.
The difference between pragmatic enrichment and efforts at disambiguation is reflected in the developmental data we have presented. These theoretical distinctions are corroborated by the sharp contrast between response patterns elicited in on-line experiments by scalar expressions (e.g. Bott and Noveck, 2004; Breheny et al., 2006) and semantically ambiguous terms. (On the processing of ambiguous words, see Swinney (1979) ; for more recent studies see for instance Kambe, Rayner and Duffy (2001) and Swaab, Brown and Hagoort (2003) .) It is therefore not surprising that the developmental profile for ambiguous structures is distinct from developmental patterns that engage pragmatic enrichments of logical terms.
Conclusions
It is now well established that, to begin with, children have problems making scalar inferences, which are often linked to the interpretation of logical terms such as some, or and might. There is no critical threshold such that children would start making scalar inferences at a certain age, although, as a group, children do not show adult-like behaviour in this respect before the age of seven. Rather, development appears to be gradual, and children's performance is linked to the effort required by the experimental task and to the relevance of narrowed-down meanings in context. Young children are not incapable of drawing what are currently called scalar inferences; they merely find it more difficult. Results reminiscent of the developmental trend linked to scalar expressions have also been found with another type of pragmatic inference: the enrichment of and. These data suggest that the semantic meaning of logical terms are the first to be accessible and that the pragmatic ability of drawing the relevant inferences develops later. Nonetheless, these findings contrast sharply with the developmental pattern observed for genuine cases of ambiguity, pointing to the specificity of the pragmatic processing and its development. Table 1 Percentage of participants in Experiment 2 who provide logical responses with respect to each of the 3 different scenarios. The values for the "keep as is" response in the Subset condition are interpreted strictly; even harmless changes (e.g., adding a token to a box) are considered violations. However, the values in parentheses show the "keep as is" responses when taken to mean "keep the truth value the same". Table 2 .
Percentage of correct responses (correct response in parentheses) as a function of the quantified statements (QN and QP) and context (2-of-3 and 3-of-3).
Statement
Presentation condition 2-of-3 3-of-3
Children QN: All the children are not in the pool. Notes. *For the sake of simplicity, this ambiguous item is considered "correct" if participants treat it as "Not every". It would be true with a Not > every reading (Not all the children are in the pool) and false with an Every > not reading (None of the children are in the pool). How participants respond to the utterance "There has to be a parrot in the box"
vs. "There might be a parrot in the box" when the context determines that indeed there must be a parrot in the box. 
